BEYOND A REASONABLE DOuBT: LIaiNG THE ABIiTY
OF STATES TO DEFINE ELEMENTS OF AN OFFENSE IN THE
CONTEXT OF HATE CRIME LEGISLATION
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
safeguards the American people against the arbitrary exercise of
power by the government.' This constitutional provision encompasses
both procedural and substantive due process rights.2 Procedural due
process requires that, during the deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, persons must be given notice and opportunity to be heard.'
Essentially, procedural due process ensures fairness during the
administration ofjustice.4
Over time, courts have expanded procedural due process to
include certain protections for criminal defendants.5 For instance, in
order to find an individual guilty of a criminal offense, the state must
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.6 This standard
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from
depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision embodies "a principle basic to our society."
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
2 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
§ 10-7, at 663 (2d ed.
1988). Substantive due process pertains to rights that are not specifically delineated
in the United States Constitution, but that the Court nevertheless found
fundamental. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of
Power Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYrON L.
REV. 313, 313-14 (1991).
3 See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 79-80 (1971) (finding that the central meaning of procedural due process is
that individuals whose rights are affected are entitled to notification and hearing).
To determine if additional procedural protections are warranted under the Due
Process Clause, courts employ a balancing test and examine the specific facts of a
case. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
4 See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 10-8, at 678. Procedural due process "guarantee [s]
those procedures which are required for the 'protection of ultimate decency in a
civilized society.'"
Id. (quoting Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
5 See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 10-8, at 683-84 (noting that, in the criminal context,
due process protects the defendant's ight to a fair trial); see also Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (ruling that the right to a jury trial in criminal
cases is "fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice").
6 See Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, 480 (1974). In Vachon, the Court
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demands that the proven facts, by the nature of their probative force,
must establish guilt to a moral certainty.7 Courts have required that,
under procedural due process, states must prove every fact necessary
to constitute the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Recently, the issue of procedural due process has been raised in
the context of hate crime legislation. 9 Hate crimes'0 are a steadily
increasing problem;" they reflect an underlying bigotry and
intolerance within society. 2 This wave of bias-motivated violence
found that the Due Process Clause requires that an individual may not be divested of
liberty "'on a record lacking any relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the
offense charged.'" Id. (quoting Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232, 1233 (1971)).
See BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 161 (6th ed. 1990). "Reasonable doubt" exists
when reasonably prudent persons would hesitate before acting in matters of
importance to themselves. See id. at 1265. American courts have sustained the
.reasonable doubt" concept since at least 1793. SeeJessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable
Doubt Juy Instruction: Giving Meaning to a CriticalConcept, 22 Am. J. CRIM. L 677, 677
(1995) (noting that a NewJersey judge, in State v. Wilson, 1 N.J.L. 502, 506 (1793),
instructed a jury "to follow the 'humane rule' and acquit the defendant if they had
'reasonable doubts' about his guilt"). It was not until 1970, however, that the United
States Supreme Court, under principles of due process, formally granted
constitutional status to the "reasonable doubt" standard. See In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970); see also infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (providing an indepth analysis of Winship). The "reasonable doubt" standard prohibits all procedural
devices that shift the burden of disproving any element of the charged offense to the
accused. SeeJOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.4(b),
at 520 (5th ed. 1995). Furthermore, the Winship Court delineated specific moral and
societal considerations that support the reasonable doubt standard. See Wnship, 397
U.S. at 363-64. The Court emphasized that communities must have faith in, and
respect for, the American system of criminal law. See id. at 364. To that end, the
Court professed that "[iut is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned." Id.
See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
See gene'rayState v. Apprendi, 159 N.J. 7 (1999).
,0 A hate crime is "[a] crime motivated by the victim's race, color, ethnicity,
religion, or national origin." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (7th ed. 1999).
Brief for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith at 4, RA.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675) (reporting a steady increase in antiSemitic incidents from 377 in 1980 to 1685 in 1990); JAcK LEVIN & JACK MCDEvr-r,
HATE CRIMES: THE RISINGTIDE OF BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED 1-5 (1993) (claiming that,
over the past few years, bias crimes have increased at an alarming rate); Jeannine F.
Hunter, Vigil Is Stand Against Racism, KNOXvILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Oct. 8, 1999, at A3
(citing rise in FBI hate crime statistics from 4558 incidents in 32 states in 1991 to
8734 in 50 states in 1996); Thomas Zolper, N.J. Cime Down 9%, THE RECORD
(Hackensack, N.J.), Sept. 1, 1999, at Al (noting a nine percent increase in hate
crimes in New Jersey between 1998 and 1999). But seeJames B. Jacobs & Jessica S.
Henry, The Social Construction of a Hate Crime Epidemic, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
366, 387-91 (1996) (arguing that the perceived increase in hate crimes is due to
society's intolerance of prejudice).
12

See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE CRIME LAWS:

(1994) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE

GUIDE]

A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 1

(discussing the rise of anti-Semitism and
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causes devastating physical and psychological harm to its victims."
Accordingly, federal and state legislators have enacted hate crime
statutes to combat this growing problem.'
Hate crime statutes fall into two general categories." The first
category creates a separate substantive offense for bias-motivated
conduct.' 6 The second category enhances the penalty for existing
crimes when the offense is motivated by bias against the victim.
Despite their salutary purposes,' s both categories of hate crime
statutes are under constitutional attack.'9
other ethnic biases); Carl Rowan, Racism and Madness in America, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug.
20, 1999, at 3C (observing the prevalence of white supremacy groups); 60 percent of
Hate Crimes Tied to Race, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1993, at 6 (noting the alarming rates of
racial and ethnic violence), An Outbreak of Bigotry, TIME, May 28, 1990, at 35
(reporting the increase of bigotry and racial tension in America and throughout the
world).
is For an analysis of the physical and unique psychic effects of hate crimes, see
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Caling 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 135-49 (1982) (considering the
damaging effects of hate crimes and the need for a tort remedy for such conduct).
This comprehensive legislative response to bias crimes was motivated by the
Anti-Defamation League's (ADL) model hate crime statute of 1981.
See
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 1. This model statute creates a separate
substantive crime for institutional vandalism, penalty enhancement for crimes
motivated by certain biases, and a civil cause of action for bias crime victims. See id.
As of 1994, 35 states adopted hate crime statutes, over half of which are based on the
ADL model. See id
15 For a discussion of the two categories of hate crime statutes,
see Frederick M.
Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crime/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and
ProtectingRacist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 682 (1993).
16 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-37a (West 1991)
(prohibiting
"[d]eprivation of a person's civil rights by person wearing [a] mask or hood... on
account of religion, national origin, alienage, color, race, [or] sex"); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 240.31 (Consol. 1984) (identifying bias-motivated conduct causing personal injury
or property damage as a first-degree offense).
7 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3 (1999) (enhancing the penalty when the
primary offense is motivated by intent to deprive another of his civil rights through
intimidation and terror); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 1993) (providing
enhanced penalties when the underlying crime is motivated by hostility toward a
protected group).
18 Houston Mayor Lee Brown believes that the purpose of hate crime legislation
embodies the essence of "the American dream." SeeJulie Mason, Mayor Details Battle
Against Hate Crimes, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 14, 1998, at Al. Mayor Brown stated that
[p]art of that dream is to live in communities where peace is present.
Our city and our nation.., have made great strides in overcoming past
injustices, past acts of hate. We cannot change the past-but we can
learn from past mistakes and make sure that they are not repeated
again.
Id.
19 For an example of constitutional attacks on the first category of hate crime
statutes, see LA.V. v. City of St. Paul 505 U.S. 377 (1992), in which the United States
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In State v. Apprendi,2° New Jersey's hate crime sentenceenhancing provision2 was challenged as violative of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution." The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, upheld the
constitutionality
of the statute, which imposes an enhanced
sentence when the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the
4 The court
evidence that the offender acted with a biased purpose.2
reasoned that a biased purpose is not an element of the offense and,
therefore, does not require ajury determination beyond a reasonable
doubt.25
In the early morning of December 22, 1994, Charles Apprendi,
Jr., a forty-four-year-old white male, 6 fired a .22-caliber rifle 7 at the
home of a black family that moved into his predominately white
neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey.2 As Apprendi fled from the

Supreme Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a municipal ordinance
prohibiting cross burning and other expressions arousing "anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." Id. at
380, The Court held that when a state regulates fighting words, such as threats or
harassment, it cannot discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint. See id. at
386. Thus, if a state attempts to prohibit only those fighting words that contain racist
hate speech, the regulation will be subject to strict scrutiny and may be found
unconstitutional. See ia at 395-96.
For an illustration of constitutional challenges to the second category of hate
crime legislation, see Wisconsin v. Mitchell 508 U.S. 476 (1993), in which the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a hate crime sentence-enhancing statute. See id. at
490. The Court posited that the First Amendment does not prohibit a state from
providing an enhanced punishment for a crime based on the actor's biased purpose
in committing the offense. See id. at 487-88.
20 159 N.J. 7, 731 A.2d 485
(1999).
21 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West
1995).
See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 12, 731 A.2d at 487.
2
See id. at 25-29, 731 A.2d at 495-97.
24 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1994). The statute provides
for an
enhanced sentence in any case in which "[t]he defendant in committing the crime
acted, at least in part, with ill will, hatred or bias toward, and with a purpose to
intimidate, an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, religion,
sexual orientation or ethnicity." Id. For convenience, this purpose will be referred
to as a "biased purpose." See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 9, 731 A.2d at 486.
See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 27, 731 A.2d at 496.
See Matt Ackermann, N.J. Anti-Hate Statute Found Constitutional, N.J. L.J., at 9
(June 28, 1999).
27 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 10, 731 A.2d at 486. On the
night of the shooting,
Apprendi was under the influence of alcohol and drugs. See Nancy Ritter, State
Upholds Bias Law; Issue for U.S. Justices?, N.J. LAw., June 28, 1999, at 3 [hereinafter
State Upholds Bias Law].
" SeeApprendi, 159 N.J. at 9-10, 731 A.2d at 486. The home belonged to Michael
and Mattie Fowlkes and their three children. See State Upholds Bias Law, supra note
27, at 3. The residence was fired at three other times. See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 10,
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scene of this incident, a neighbor recognized his gray Chevrolet truck
and subsequently contacted the police.Y Approximately twenty
minutes later, several police officers arrested Apprendi at his home."
An ensuing search of Apprendi's home revealed an
antipersonnel bomb and a .22-caliber rifle."' In response to police
questioning, Apprendi admitted that he fired four or five bullets into
the home."' Apprendi gave a subsequent statement acknowledging
that "he [did] not know the... victims or the family, but because
they [were] black in color he [did] not want them in the
neighborhood... [and that he was] just giving them a message that
they were in his neighborhood."ss Accordingly, a grand jury returned
a twenty-two count indictment against Apprendi."
On July 24, 1995, Apprendi negotiated a plea agreement in
which he pled guilty to several charges, including two counts of
possession of a rifle for an unlawful purpose and one count of
possession of a prohibited weapon."3 The State then moved to have
Apprendi sentenced to an extended term pursuant to title 2C, section
44-3(e) of the New Jersey Statutes.36 At the related sentencing

731 A.2d at 486. On September 24, 1994, a bullet penetrated a window of the house.
See id.Again, in November 1994, bullets, on two separate occasions, were fired into
the exterior of the house. See id.During the December 22, 1994 shooting, none of
the family members were injured. See Prison Term for Man Who Shot at Home, THE
RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.), Oct. 1, 1995, at N8 [hereinafter Prison Term]. One bullet
struck the front door, however, and another bullet pierced a window near the bed of
the couple's nine-year-old boy. See id
29 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 10, 731 A.2d
at 486.
30 See
id
31
32
33

Seeid.
See id
Id (emphasis added).

See id. This indictment included charges of attempted murder, attempted
aggravated assault, harassment, possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,
possession of a prohibited weapon, and possession of a destructive device. See id, 731
A.2d at 486-87.
35 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 10, 731
A.2d at 487. The court noted that
"[p]ossession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose is a second-degree crime for
which the ordinary term is between five and ten years." Id. at 11, 731 A.2d at 487.
Illegally possessing a prohibited weapon is a third-degree offense in violation of title
2C, section 39-3(a) of the New Jersey Statutes. See State v. Apprendi, 304 N.J. Super.
147, 150, 698 A.2d 1265, 1266 (App. Div. 1997) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3(a)
(West 1995)).
See Apprend, 304 N.J. Super. at 150, 698 A.2d at 1267. Hate crimes are
sentenced one degree higher than the traditional punishment for the substantive
offense. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 20:43-7(a)(3), (4) (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2C:43-6(a) (2), (3) (West 1995). Thus, the extended sentence for a second-degree
offense is approximately between ten and twenty years imprisonment, the common
range for a first-degree offense. See Apprendi, 304 N.J. Super. at 150, 698 A.2d at
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hearing, Apprendi retracted his earlier statement that he shot at the
house because he wanted to keep blacks away from the area.3
Rather, he accused the police of unfairly pressuring him into a false
statement via threats and a lengthy interrogation.- Apprendi also
denied that he was a racist or a member of any racist group.39 The
trial judge, however, rejected his explanations and suspected that
Apprendi had changed his story to avoid the enhanced penalty for a
bias crimei 0 Thus, satisfied that the preponderance of the evidence
showed that the shooting was motivated by racial bias, the judge
imposed an enhanced penalty under title 2C, section 44-3(e) of the
NewJersey Statutes.4
1267. For a third-degree violation, the extended sentence is five to ten years
imprisonment, which is the usual range for a second-degree offense. See id.
37 See text accompanying note 33 supra (providing Apprendi's
incriminating
statement). Apprendi claimed that he randomly aimed at the glass and purple door
that caught his eye. See Thomas Martello, Supreme Court Upholds State's Hate Crime
Statute, THE REcoRD (Hackensack, N.J.),June 26, 1999, at A4.
See Lydia Barbara Bashwiner, Extended Ten Proper If Judge Is Satisfied
by
Preponderance of Evidence of Racial Motive, N.J. LAW., Aug. 25, 1997, at 24. This
explanation was supported by a psychologist's testimony that a person of Apprendi's
personality type would lie, if necessary, to end an unpleasant police interrogation.
See Apprendi, 304 N.J. Super. at 151, 698 A.2d at 1267.
The psychologist also evaluated Apprendi's mental state in order to establish the
underlying motive for the shooting. See id. Apprendi was diagnosed as having a
cyclothymic disorder (extreme mood swings), obsessive-compulsive disorder,
kleptomania, premature ejaculation, and alcohol and drug dependence. See id.
Based on this evidence, the psychologist concluded that, although his judgment and
impulse control were substantially impaired during the shooting, Apprendi knew
that he was discharging his weapon toward the victim's house and that it was
improper to do so. SeeApprendi, 159 N.J. at 11, 731 A.2d at 487.
See Apprendi, 304 N.J. Super. at 151, 698 A.2d at 1267. Apprendi apologized
to
the Fowlkes family by stating that "[he] never meant to hurt or scare anybody. I
thank God nobody was hurt. My forty years of life is proof that racism is not a part of
my life." Prison Term, supra note 28, at 8.
40 See Apprendi, 304 N.J. Super. at 151, 698 A.2d at 1267. The
trial judge also
rejected Apprendi's contention that his earlier statement was the product of an
onerous and dictatorial police interrogation. See id. Rather, the judge believed that
this statement, evincing an obvious racial bias, embodied the true motive for the
shooting. See id. Moreover, the judge dismissed any psychological defenses, stating
that Apprendi's condition did not rise to the level of a diminished capacity or
insanity defense under title 2C, section 4-1 of the New Jersey Statutes. See Apprendi,
159 N.J. at 11, 731 A.2d at 487.
41 See Apprendi, 304 N.J. Super. at 149, 698 A.2d at 1266. The court sentenced
Apprendi, based on one of the unlawful purpose counts, to an extended term of
twelve years imprisonment without the possibility of parole for four years. See id. at
151, 698 A.2d at 1267. On the remaining two counts, Apprendi was concurrently
sentenced to a term of seven years imprisonment without the possibility of parole for
three years and a term of three years imprisonment. See id. Apprendi was also
ordered to give $1980 in restitution to the victim, $100 Violent Crimes
Compensation Board penalty on each of the three counts, and a $75 Safe Street Act

2000]

HA TE CRIME LEGISLATION

899

Apprendi appealed his extended sentence, asserting that section
44-3(e) was unconstitutionally vague and violated the right to due
process by allowing a judge to find a biased purpose using a mere
preponderance of the evidence standard.42 The Superior Court of
New Jersey, Appellate Division, however, dismissed both of these
challenges and affirmed the extended sentence.4
Relying on
McMillan v. Pennsylvania," the court posited that section 44-3(e), the
hate crime statute, merely examines a traditional sentencing factor,
motive for a crime, and dictates the precise weight to be given to this
factor.4 Additionally, the court noted that due process does not
require such sentencing factors to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.'6 The court also concluded that legislatures are justified in
treating bias-motivated offenses with enhanced severity because such
crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory violence, inflict
emotional harm on their victims, and incite community unrest.4
Apprendi appealed this decision as of right,4 8 and the New Jersey
Supreme Court granted certification.49 The court held that a jury is
fine. See id. The remaining counts were dismissed. See id
42 See id at 152, 698 A.2d at 1267.
43 See id, 698 A.2d at 1268.
The appellate division quickly dismissed the
vagueness challenge based upon the NewJersey Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Mortimer, 135 N.J. 517, 641 A.2d 257 (1994).
In Mortimer, the court rejected a
vagueness challenge to the language in title 2C, section 334(d) of the New Jersey
Statutes, which provided that harassment, a petty disorderly persons offense, would
be raised to a fourth-degree offense if the defendant acted, "at least in part, with ill
will, hatred or bias toward, and with a purpose to intimidate ... because of race,
color, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity." Mortimer, 135 N.J. at 526, 641 A.2d
at 261. Moreover, the court excised the words "at least in part, with ill will, hatred or
bias toward" to cure the vagueness problem. Id at 534, 641 A.2d at 265.
Because section 44-3(e) contained the same language as that construed in
Mortimer, the appellate division dismissed Apprendi's vagueness challenge and
removed the words "at least in part, with ill will, hatred or bias toward" to conform
with the Legislature's amended version of the statute. Apprendi, 304 N.J. Super. at
152, 698 A.2d at 1268.
'
477 U.S. 79 (1986);
see also infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text
(discussing McMillan in depth).
See Apprendi, 304 NJ. Super. at 155, 698 A.2d at 1269. In determining that
motive was a sentencing factor, and not an essential element of the offense, the court
distinguished motive from intent. See id The court announced that "'motive is the
inducement for doing an act; the intent is the resolve to commit an act. Stated
differently, motive relates to the end; intent relates to the means.'" Id. at 157, 698
A.2d at 1270 (quoting BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICrIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 458
(2d ed. 1995)).
46 See id. at 155, 698 A.2d
at 1269.
47 See id. at 157, 698 A.2d at
1270.
48

See NJ. CT. R. 2:2-1 (a) (2) (permitting an appeal to the New Jersey Supreme

Court in any case in which there is a dissent in the appellate division).
See State v. Apprendi, 159 N.J. 7, 13, 731 A.2d 485, 488 (1999). This appeal was
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not required to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether a
particular defendant acted with a biased purpose in violation of title
2C, section 44-3(e)." Rather, the court declared that it is proper for a
judge to utilize the preponderance of the evidence standard to
decide the existence of such a biased purpose." Rejecting the notion
that it is an element of an offense, the court asserted that, similar to
recidivism,52 a biased purpose is a traditional and objective sentencing
factor. The court explained that section 44-3(e) simply dictates the
precise weight to be given to this factor.54 The court also maintained
that requiring juries to make the biased-purpose determination
would create a risk of prejudice for defendants as it would expose
trials to evidence of previous acts of bias.m Therefore, claiming that
all courts would agree that Apprendi acted with a biased purpose, the
court affirmed the decision of the appellate division and upheld the
extended sentence.5
Pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, criminal defendants
are entitled to certain procedural safeguards. 57 The United States
Supreme Court first delineated these protections in In re Winship.", In
Winship, a New York Family Court judge found a twelve-year-old boy
strictly limited to the issue of whether a biased purpose, under section 44-3(e), is an
element of the offense that must be determined by ajury beyond a reasonable doubt.
See id. at 9, 731 A.2d at 486.
50 See id. at 27-28, 731 A.2d at
486-87.
51
52

See id.
See SUE TITUS

REID, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY

299 (8th ed. 1997) (defining

recidivism as "further violations of the law by released suspects or inmates, or
noncriminal violations of conditions by probationers and parolees"). Recidivism
means the propensity of habitual criminals to relapse into criminal behavior. See
BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990). Recent studies indicate that two-thirds
of released prisoners will commit other crimes and thus become recidivists. See REID,
supra, at 608. These studies also show that certain variables are significantly related
to recidivism: (1) property offenders have the highest rates of recidivism; (2) the
probability of recidivism increases in direct proportion to a person's number of prior
juvenile and adult convictions; (3) the presence of an income, regardless of source
or amount, leads to lower rates of recidivism; and (4) recidivism rates are lower for
those individuals living with a spouse and children. See id. at 608-09.
53 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 24, 731 A.2d
at 494-95. In its analysis, the court relied
primarily on Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). See Apprendi, 159
N.J. at 24, 731 A.2d at 495; see also infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text
(discussing Almendarez-Torresin detail).
54 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 24, 731 A.2d
at 494-95.
55 See id. at 26, 731
A.2d at 495.
56 See id. at 28-29, 731 A.2d
at 496-97.
57 See supra notes 3-8 (examining the procedural protections
of the Due Process
Clause).
58

397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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guilty of theft, while acknowledging that the evidence did not
establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." The United States
Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision by explicitly holding
that the Due Process Clause protects criminal defendants against
convictions when the prosecution fails to prove every fact necessary to
constitute the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.60 The Court
emphasized that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a wellestablished common-law principle. 6' The Court also noted that, from
a practical standpoint, requiring this standard of proof would reduce
the likelihood of errors in criminal trials.6 Therefore, the Court
See i& at 359. The judge, relying on a provision in the New York Family Court
Act that authorized use of the preponderance of the evidence standard, rejected the
contention that the Fourteenth Amendment requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. See ids Section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act provided that "[a] ny
determination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory] hearing that a Uuvenile] did an
act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence standard." I&
60 See is&at 364. The Court explained the moral justifications
for requiring this
standard of proof:
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American
scheme of criminal procedure ....
The standard provides concrete
substance for the presumption of innocence---that bedrock "axiomatic
and elementary" principle whose "enforcement lies at the foundation
of the administration of our criminal law."... "[A] person accused of a
crime... would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting
to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and
imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence as would
suffice in a civil case."
[A] society that values the good name and freedom of every
individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when
there is reasonable doubt of his guilt.
IM at 363-64 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
61 See id. at 361. The Court maintained:
The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a
Nation.... Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonabledoubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively
establish it as a requirement of due process, such adherence does
"reflect a profound judgement about the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered."
I& at 361-62 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)).
6
See i& at 364. The Court reasoned:
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in
factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one
party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal
defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the
process of placing on the other party the burden of... persuading the
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
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expressly stated for the first time that the Due Process Clause
required a standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt.6
Five years later, in Mullaney v. Wilbur," the Supreme Court
broadened the application of the Winship principle.5 In Mullaney, an
individual was convicted of murder when a Maine court permitted
malice aforethought to be conclusively implied when the defendant
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted
in the "heat of passion."'
The State claimed that, because the
relevant statute did not define "heat of passion" as an essential
element of the offense, there was no constitutional mandate for the
State to prove such "heat of passion" beyond a reasonable doubt. 6
The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected the notion that
Winship only applied to those elements of a crime as defined by state
law.6 9 Rather, the Court declared that substantive aspects of a crime,
such as "heat of passion," must be disproved by the prosecution
beyond a reasonable doubt, irrespective of their labels under state
law.7" To rule otherwise, the Court reasoned, would enable states to
undermine the Due Process Clause by characterizing elements of a
crime as mere punishment or sentencing factors.7'
63

See id

421 U.S. 684 (1975).
See id.at 698-99.
66 See id at 686. "Malice aforethought" is defined as a "'premeditated design
to
kill' thereby manifesting a 'general malignancy and disregard for human life which
proceeds from a heart void of social duty and fatally bent on mischief.'" Id at 686
n.4 (citation omitted).
67 See id at 687. "'Heat of passion ...means that at the time of the
act the
[actor's] reason is disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might
[make] ordinary men of fair, average disposition liable to act irrationally without due
deliberation or reflection, and from passion rather than judgment.'" Id. at 687 n.5
(citation omitted).
68 See idat 696-97. Under Maine common law, murder and manslaughter
were
varying degrees of the single crime of felonious homicide. See id at 688. Criminal
defendants may only be convicted of felonious homicide when the prosecution
proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the killing was unlawful and intentional. See
id at 685. Only when these essential elements are established can the existence or
absence of "heat of passion" be used as a factor in ascertaining the level of culpabilityattached to homicide. See id at 696. Simply, the proof of "heat of passion" reduces a
felonious homicide charge from murder to manslaughter. See idat 687. Therefore,
because the presence or absence of "heat of passion" is considered a punishment
factor, and not an essential element, the Maine SupremeJudicial Court asserted that
Winship was not violated by requiring the defendant to prove this factor by the
preponderance of the evidence. See id at 696-97; see also infra note 173 and
accompanying text (defining mens rea and levels of culpability).
69 See Mullaney, 412 U.S. at 698-99.
64
6

70

See id at 703-04.

71

See idat 698-99. The Court maintained:
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The Court, however, qualified this holding in Patterson v. New
York,7 which upheld a statute that required second-degree murder
defendants to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.7 The Court
announced that the Due Process Clause does not require a state to
disprove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts that serve as exculpatory
or mitigating factors affecting the severity of the penalty or the level
of culpability. 4 Here, the Court assessed, the prosecution met its
[I]f Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as
defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that
decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive change in
its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that
constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear
solely on the extent of punishment. An extreme example of this
approach can be fashioned from the law challenged in this case.
Maine divides the single generic offense of felonious homicide into
voluntary
three
distinct
punishment
categories-murder,
manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. Only the first two of
these categories require that the homicidal act either be intentional or
the result of criminally reckless conduct. But under Maine law these
facts of intent are not general elements of the crime of felonious
homicide. Instead, they bear only on the appropriate punishment
category. Thus, if petitioners' argument were accepted, Maine could
impose a life sentence for any felonious homicide-even one that
traditionally might be considered involuntary manslaughter-unless
the defendant was able to prove that his act was neither intentional nor
criminally reckless. Winship is concerned with substance rather than
this kind of formalism.
Id

432 U.S. 197 (1977).
See id. at 198. This New York law provides, in relevant part:
"A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: 1. With
intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under
this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that: (a) The defendant
acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which
there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of
which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant
believes them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime."
Id. at 198 n.2 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 1975)). Thus, proof of
this affirmative defense typically reduced a second-degree murder charge to that of
first-degree manslaughter. See id. at 199.
In Patterson,the defendant fatally shot a partially unclothed man in the presence
of the defendant's estranged wife. See id. at 198. The defendant was subsequently
convicted of second-degree murder under the above statute when he failed to
mitigate this charge by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he acted
under extreme emotional disturbance. See id. at 200.
74 See id. at 207 (emphasis added). The
Court reasoned:
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constitutional mandate by proving all essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 Therefore, the Court concluded that
due process was not offended by requiring the defendant to prove
the existence of an affirmative defense.76
Here, in revising its criminal code, New York provided the affirmative
defense of extreme emotional disturbance... but it was willing to do
so only if the facts making out the defense were established by the
defendant with sufficient certainty. The State was itself unwilling to
undertake to establish the absence of those facts beyond a reasonable
doubt, perhaps fearing that proof would be too difficult and that too
many persons deserving treatment as murderers would escape that
punishment if the evidence need merely raise a reasonable doubt
about the defendant's emotional state. It has been said that the new
criminal code of New York contains some 25 affirmative defenses which
exculpate or mitigate but which must be established by the defendant
to be operative ... The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put
New York to the choice of abandoning those defenses or undertaking
to disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime which
otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by substantial
punishment.
Id. at 207-08 (footnote omitted); see also Anthony J. Dennis, Fifth Amendment-Due
Process Rights at Sentencing, 77J. GRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 646, 651-52 (1986) (stating
that, in Patterson, "the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard was a function
of how the state defined the offense").
See Patterson,432 U.S. at 206. Stressing that the State satisfied its burden under
the Due Process Clause, the Court explained:
The crime of murder is defined by the statute... as causing the death
of another person with the intent to do so. The death, the intent to
kill, and causation are the facts that the State is required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt if a person is to be convicted of murder...
[T]he guilty verdict confirms that the State successfully carried its
burden of proving the facts of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt...
It seems to us that the State satisfied the mandate of Winship that it
prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which [Patterson was] charged."
Id. at 205-06 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970)); see also supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing Winship in
detail).
The Court also distinguished this New York statute from the invalidated Maine
law at issue in Mullaney. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 216. The Court noted that, in
Patterson, no elements of the crime were either presumed or inferred against the
defendant. See id. Rather, because the State established each element of the offense,
the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the statute and the defendant's
conviction. See id.
76 See id. at 210. The Court summated:
We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative
countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the
culpability of an accused. Traditionally, due process has required that
only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle
balancing of society's interests against those of the accused have been
left to the legislative branch. We therefore will not disturb the balance
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Nine years later, the Court revisited this due process issue in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania." In McMillan, the Court sustained a statute
that imposed a minimum five-year sentence if the judge determined,
based on the preponderance of evidence, that the defendant visibly
possessed a weapon during the perpetration of the crime." While
acknowledging that due process limits a state's authority to define the
elements of a crime, the Court held that this statute did not surpass
these limits.79 The Court based this conclusion upon five critical
findings: 8' (1) the statute did not presume the existence of any
essential element of the offense;8' (2) the defendant did not face a
disparity in sentencing;8 (3) the law did not alter the maximum
punishment for the crime, but rather, divested the judge's discretion
in selecting a penalty;s (4) the statute did not create a separate
offense calling for a separate penalty;" and (5) the Pennsylvania
Legislature made no attempt to evade due process by labeling visible
possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor, as opposed to an
element of the offense.8
The McMillan factors were applied more than a decade later in
struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is
charged. Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has
never been constitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to
fashion such a rule in this case and apply it to the statutory defense at
issue here.

Id.
77

477 U.S. 79 (1986).
See id. at 81-82.

The statute, known as Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act of 1982, imposed mandatory minimum sentences on anyone
convicted of certain enumerated felonies when the judge determined that the
person visibly possessed a weapon while committing a crime. See id. The Act did not,
however, authorize a sentence exceeding the penalty for the underlying crime. See
id Rather, it simply divested the judge of any discretion to impose a lesser sentence.
See id
7
See id. at 86.
80 See id at 86-91. For convenience purposes, these five critical
determinations
will be referred to as the "McMillan factors."
81 See id at 86. Because there was no reallocation of burdens of proof, the
Court
found that, unlike Patterson, this statute fell on the permissible side of the
Constitution. See id.
82 See it at 87 (noting that a differential in sentencing
exists when the sentence
imposed for a crime ranges from a nominal fee to a mandatory life sentence). In
making this determination, the Court noted that the range of penalties under this
statute was much less severe than those considered in Mullaney. See id
See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88.
78

84

See id.

8

See id. at 88.
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States." The statute upheld in AlmendarezTorres authorized an enhanced prison term for deported aliens
returning to the United States when their initial deportation was
pursuant to a conviction for an aggravated felony."' The Court held
that this statute did not create a separate substantive offense such that
the element of recidivism needed to be included in an indictment
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.8 Rather, the Court found
that the existence of a prior aggravated felony was a mere sentencing
factor that the sentencing judge could independently establish. 9 The
Court reasoned that Congress designed this statute to set forth a
sentencing factor and that such legislative intent is usually
dispositive.Y' Moreover, the Court rejected the claim that recidivism
must be treated as an element of the offense because this statute
fulfilled most of the McMillan factors.'
523 U.S. 224 (1998).
81

part:

See id. at 226. Tide 8, § 1326 of the United States Code provides, in pertinent

"Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who - (1) has been
...deported ... and thereafter (2) enters ... or is at any time found
in, the United States [without the Attorney General's consent or the
legal equivalent], shall be fined under tide 18, or imprisoned not more
than 2 years, or both. (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this
section, in the case of any alien described in such subsection - (1)
whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of
[certain misdemeanors], or a felony (other than an aggravated felony),
such alien shall be fined under title 18, imprisonment not more than
10 years, or both; or (2) whose deportation was subsequent to a
conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be
fined under such title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."
Id. at 229 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994)). The defendant,
in this case, was an alien who returned to the United States after an earlier
deportation pursuant to three convictions for aggravated felonies. See i& at 227.
M See id at 247; see also Todd Meadow, Note, Almendarez-Torres v. United States:
Constitutional Limits on Government's Power to Define Crimes, 31 CONN. L. REv. 1583,
1591-92 (1999) (articulating congressional intent not to create a separate substantive
offense when enacting the statute at hand).
See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247.
90 See id at 235.
91 See id at 242 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S.
at 85).
92 See id at 242-43. The Court explained that the statute satisfied the following
McMiUan factors: (1) the law did not presume the existence of any essential element
of the offense; (2) the statute did not create a separate offense requiring a separate
penalty; and (3) Congress made no attempt to evade the Constitution by labeling
recidivism as a sentencing factor. See id. at 243 (citing McMiUan, 477 U.S. at 87-88).
The Court, however, recognized that the statute at issue increased the maximum
permissible sentence, while the law examined in McMillan invoked a mandatory
minimum sentence. See id. at 244. Yet that difference, the Court held, created no
unfairness for the criminal defendant because, unlike McMillan, the sentencing
judge retained discretion to impose a lesser sentence. See ia at 244-45 (citing
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Only one year later, in Jones v. United States," the Court retreated
from Almendarez-Torres by holding that, under the Due Process Clause,
any fact other than recidivism that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be included in an indictment and proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt." In Jones, the Court construed a federal
carjacking statute" that imposed an enhanced penalty when the
offender caused serious bodily injury to another during the taking of
a motor vehicle.9 6 The Court determined that Congress intended for
serious bodily injury to be an element defining an aggravated form of
the crime.97 The Court also recognized that states may not evade the
mandates of due process by insulating juries from a fact that increases
the severity of the penalty.8
Lastly, the Court acknowledged
recidivism, with its well-established tradition as a sentencing factor, as
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 95). In addition, while the statute created a wide range of
punishments, the Court ruled that such a broad sentencing range does not itself
create significantly greater unfairness. See id. at 245. Lastly, in declaring that the
McMillan factors were satisfied, the Court emphasized that recidivism was a tradition
and perhaps the most traditional factor for increasing an offender's punishment. See
id at 243.
9s 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
94 See id. at 243 n.6. This holding was based upon the
safeguards in the Due
Process Clause and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment. See
id.
% See id. at 230. At the time of this case, the federal carjacking statute read as
follows:
"Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title,
takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received
in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of
another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so,
shall-(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15
years, or both, (2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of
this title) results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
25 years or both, and (3) if death results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both."
Id. 96(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994)).
See id. The defendant in this case, along with two accomplices, held up two
victims and stole their car. See id. at 229. During the commission of this carjacking,
the defendant stuck his gun in the left ear of one victim and then hit him on the
head. See id at 229. As a result of this attack, the victim sustained a perforated
eardrum and permanent hearing loss. See id. at 231. After crashing the stolen
vehicle into a telephone pole, the defendant was arrested. See id. at 230.
While neither the indictment nor jury instructions mentioned a serious bodily
injury, the district court judge, contending that a serious bodily injury was
established by the preponderance of the evidence, sentenced the defendant to a
twenty-five-year prison term. See id. at 231. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed this decision, but remanded for resentencing on other grounds. See id. at
231 n.2.
97 See id. at 235.
9
See id. at 240-41.
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an exception to the general rule that every fact expanding the
penalty range must be included in an indictment and determined by
ajury beyond a reasonable doubt.9
Upon this framework of precedent, the New Jersey Supreme
Court decided State v. Apprendi in June of 19992 00 Justice O'Hern,
writing for the majority,'0 ' initially discussed the nationwide
development of hate crime laws,'2 commenting that New Jersey, in
1981, was one of the first states to adopt such a statute.' 3 The court
recognized that the breadth of New Jersey hate crime law was
expanded in 1990 with the enactment of the Ethnic Intimidation
Act. 4 The court acknowledged that this act closely resembled the
Anti-Defamation League's model hate crime statute."
Justice O'Hern then examined two United States Supreme Court
See Jones, 526 U.S. at 248-49. The Court noted that Almendarez-Torres was not
dispositive of the present matter because it failed to consider the Sixth Amendment
right to ajury trial and because its holding was extremely limited to unique facts, like
recidivism, that have traditions as well-established sentencing factors. See id; see also
Benjamin J. Priester, FurtherDevelopments on Previous Symposia: Sentenced for a "Crime"
the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the ConstitutionalLimitations
on Factfindingby SentencingFactors Rather Than Elements of the Offense, 61 L. & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 249, 294-95 (1998) (discussing the tension between sentencing factors and
elements of the offense and criticizing the Court's inability to resolve this conflict in
Jones v. United States).
"00 159 N.J. 7, 731 A.2d
485 (1999).
0 See id at 9, 731 A.2d at 486. ChiefJustice Poritz andJustices Pollock, Garibaldi,
and Coleman joined the majority opinion. See id at 54, 731 A.2d at 513.
102 See id at 14, 731
A.2d at 488.
103 See id, 731 A.2d at 489. NewJersey's 1981 hate crime
law prohibited burning
crosses or placing swastikas on any property for the purpose of terrorizing others. See
id Specifically, the statute explicitly outlawed placing such graffiti on places of
worship or cemeteries. See id
104 See id
The Ethnic Intimidation Act of 1990 increased a disorderly persons
offense of simple assault to a fourth-degree crime if the actor had a biased purpose
in selecting the victim. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(e) (West 1995). This Act also
raised a petty disorderly persons offense of harassment to a fourth-degree crime if
the offender had a biased purpose in selecting the victim. See id § 2C:33-4(d).
Furthermore, the statute permitted sentence enhancement of other first-, second-, or
third-degree crimes. See id. § 2C:44-3(e).
The court noted the impressions of Governor Florio upon signing this
legislation. Governor Florio stated:
"From now on, the law in New Jersey will be intolerant of ethnic
intimidation. Those who commit these crimes of hate are going to face
additional charges. From now on, hate crimes will be serious crimes,
whether it's a phone call in the middle of the night or vandalism that
leaves hateful symbols in its wake or racial slurs."
Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 14, 731 A.2d at 489 (citations omitted).
105 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 15, 731 A.2d at 489; see also supra note 14 and
accompanying text (discussing the provisions of the ADL's model hate crime
statute).
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decisions that determined the constitutionality of certain types of
hate crime laws."° The court referred first to RA. V. v. City of St. Pau4
in which the United States Supreme Court announced that state laws
may not impose content-based restrictions on speech.' 7 The New
Jersey Supreme Court then acknowledged Wisconsin v. Mitchell in
which the Court upheld the constitutionality of penalty
enhancements for bias-motivated crimes.'8 Justice O'Hern then
recounted the court's own application of these two decisions."
The justice articulated that the court, in State v. Vawter,"
declared that the 1981 hate crime statutory provisions were
impermissible content-based restrictions."' The court explained that,
in Vawter, these provisions were found unconstitutional because they
punished only those threats and expressions that evinced racial and
ethnic biases." 2 The court emphasized the prior conclusion that the
New Jersey Legislature attempted to ban the expression of certain
messages with which it disagreed."" Because RA.V prohibited such
viewpoint restrictions, the court reiterated its earlier holding that
these sections had violated the First Amendment.""
6
107

See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 15, 731 A.2d at 489-90.
See id, 731 A.2d at 489; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text

(discussing RA.V. in detail).
10 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 15-16, 731 A.2d at 490; see also supra note 19 and
accompanying text (examining Mitchel). The court then criticized these decisions,
arguing that it was unclear how the law in Mitchel was directed at conduct, while the
unconstitutional statute in R.A. V. was directed solely at speech. See Apprendi, 159 N.J.
at 16, 731 A.2d at 490.
1
See id at 16-17, 731 A.2d at 490-91.
110 136 N.J. 56, 642 A.2d 349 (1994). In Vawter, the defendant, along with an
accomplice, painted Nazi symbols and hateful words on a Jewish synagogue and
wrote a satanic legend on the driveway of a Roman Catholic church. See id at 61, 642
A.2d at 352. The two individuals were subsequently arrested and charged with
violating sections 10 and 11 of New Jersey's hate crime statute, which forbade
intimidation by placing hateful symbols on a place of worship. See App"ndi, 159 N.J.
at 13, 731 A.2d at 488.
See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 17, 731 A.2d at 490.
"
See id
SSee id.
14
See id. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
The court also recognized Justice Stein's disagreement with the logic in RA.V
See Apprend/, 159 N.J. at 17, 731 A.2d at 490. The court noted that Justice Stein
believed that R.A.V. was not an exhaustive analysis and that title 2C, section 33-10 to 11 of the New Jersey Statutes represented a legitimate legislative response to biasmotivated crimes. See id.
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Next, the court turned to State v. Mortimer,"5 in which title 2C,
section 33-4d of the New Jersey Statutes was challenged as
unconstitutional."' Distinguishing the sections at issue in Vawter, the
court explained that this provision only proscribed harassing conduct
itself, not hateful expressions." 7 Thus,Justice O'Hern explained that
in Mortimer, the court found that this provision breached neither the
mandates of the First Amendment nor the ruling of RA.V"
The
court, however, did reiterate the earlier conclusion that the statutory
language of section 33-4d was unconstitutionally vague because it
failed to clearly state what it prohibited."9
Consequently, Justice
O'Hern recalled that the Court had excised this vague language from
the statute and that the New Jersey Legislature amended the
language in sections 33-4d and 44-3(e).'"
Having fully examined New Jersey's application of federal and
state hate crime law, the court conceded that the question of whether
due process requires ajury, and not ajudge, to find a biased purpose
beyond a reasonable doubt remains unanswered. 2 ' Justice O'Hern
clarified that neither Mitchell nor Mortimer indicated that a penalty
enhancement may be unconstitutional when it permits a judge to
make biased-purpose determinations upon a preponderance of the
evidence.'2 The court, therefore, analyzed when due process requires
ajury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.'3
While Winship and the Due Process Clause require that all
essential elements of an offense be established beyond a reasonable

15

135 N.J. 517, 641 A.2d 257 (1994). The defendant, along with two juveniles,

painted hateful words on the garage of a Pakistani family. See Mortimer, 135 N.J. at
523, 641 A.2d at 260. Police charged the defendant with two counts of ethnic
harassment under section 33-4(d), which prohibited harassment by hateful

communications and made the crime a fourth-degree offense if the offender acted in
part with bias, hatred, or ill will and with an intent to intimidate based on race, color,
relikion, gender, or sexual orientation. See i4 at 523-24, 641 A.2d at 257.
See ApprenAi, 159 N.J. at 17, 731 A.2d at 490.
" See id., 731 A.2d at 491.

See idi, 731 A.2d at 490.
See id, 731 A.2d at 491. The contested portion of the statute was "'at least in
part, with ill will, hatred or bias toward'" the victim. IM. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. §
118
19

2C:33-4(d) (West 1995)). At the time of this case, the same language existed in title
2C, section 44-3(e), NewJersey's hate crime sentence-enhancing provision. See it. at

18, 731 A.2d at 491.
10 See id. at 18, 731 A.2d
at 491.
121 See I/.
12se2 Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 18, 731 A.2d at 491. While the jury in Mitche! found
that the defendant selected his victim based upon race, the United States Supreme
Court failed to state whether this was required. See id.
In See id.
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doubt, 24 the court assessed that there is no precise test for discerning
such essential elements.2 5 Moreover, after examining the definition
of an element of an offense in title 2C, section 1-14(h) of the New
Jersey Statutes, Justice O'Hern determined that further inquiry was
warranted because this provision did not explicitly address the
sentence-enhancing statute. 26
The court's focus then shifted to a line of United States Supreme
Court decisions that addressed the interplay between due process and
the discernment of an element of an offense.2 7 The court noted that,
in MuUaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court required a state, under the
Due Process Clause, to prove the absence of "heat of passion" beyond
a reasonable doubt. 28 The court proceeded to discuss Martin v.
Ohio," in which the Court upheld a statute that required the
defendant, and not the State, to prove the existence of self-defense
because such evidence would negate the State's case.'3 The justice
124 See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing Winship in detail).

See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 18, 731 A.2d at 491.
See id. Title 2C, section 1-14(h) of the New Jersey Statutes defines an element
of a crime as:
"(1) such conduct or (2) such attendant circumstances or (3) such a
result of conduct as (a) is included in the description of the forbidden
conduct in the definition of the offense; (b) establishes the required
kind of culpability; (c) negatives an excuse or justification for such
conduct; (d) negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; (e)
establishes jurisdiction or venue."
Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 201-14(h) (West 1995)).
25

1

12

See id-

See id. at 18-19, 731 A.2d at 491; see also supra notes 64-71 and accompanying
text (discussing Mullaney).
12
480 U.S. 228 (1987).
ISOSee Apprend4 159 NJ. at 19, 731 A.2d at 491. In Martin, the defendant and her
husband argued over grocery money. See Martin, 480 U.S. at 230-31. The defendant
claimed that, during the confrontation, her husband hit her on the head. See id. at
231. The defendant asserted that she then retreated upstairs, put on a robe,
retrieved her husband's gun, and returned downstairs for the purpose of disposing
the weapon. See id. Viewing something in his wife's hand, the husband approached
the defendant and inquired about the weapon. See iii The defendant then fired five
or six shots, three of which struck and killed her husband. See id. The defendant was
subsequently arrested for aggravated murder. See id,
Under Ohio law, "aggravated murder" is defined as "purposely, and with prior
calculation and design, [causing] the death of another." Id. Moreover, the State had
to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Nevertheless, the
affirmative defense of self-defense was afforded to criminal defendants when they
proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they (1) did not give rise to the
argument; (2) honestly believed that they were in imminent danger, and (3) did not
breach any duty to retreat or avoid danger. See ii at 230 (citation omitted).
At trial, ajury convicted the defendant of aggravated murder, indicating that she
did not meet her burden of proving self-defense. See id. at 231. The defendant then
129
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then noted that, in Patterson v. New York, a defendant's burden to
prove the mitigating factor of extreme emotional disturbance was
also sustained.'
The court then considered McMillan,"" which affirmed a statute
that required the judge to impose a minimum sentence when the
defendant committed an offense in visible possession of a firearm."
The court emphasized that McMillan held that the Due Process
Clause did not require the State to treat such a sentencing factor as
Moreover, the court agreed with
an element of the offense."
McMillan that connecting the severity of a punishment to the
presence or absence of a fact does not necessarily make that fact an
element of the offense. 5 The court also observed, quoting the
McMillan Court, that "'the state legislature's definition of the
elements of the offense is usually dispositive.""6 The court, however,
ended its review of McMillan by noting that there are constitutional
limits on the legislative authority to define elements of an offense,
even though such limits were not explicitly defined in McMillan."7
Because the United States Supreme Court refused to do so, the New
Jersey Supreme Court attempted to define these constitutional limits
and apply them to New Jersey's hate crime sentence-enhancing
provision.'s

The court began by stating that biased purpose could be an
element of the offense, even though the hate crime sentenceenhancing provision is located within the sentencing sections of the
The court also dismissed the
Code of Criminal Justice.'39
brought an appeal, claiming that it violated due process to require the defendant,
and not the State, to prove the elements of an affirmative defense. See id
1
See Apprendi, 159 NJ. at 19; 731 A.2d at 491; see also supra notes 72-76 and
accompanying text (discussing Patterson).
132 See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (examining the McMilan
holding).
" SeeApprendi, 159 N.J. at 19, 731A.2d at491.
3
See id.
135 See id.,
731 A.2d at 491-92 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214
(1977)).
S Id., 731 A.2d at 492 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 85
(1986)).
1
See i&.
(citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86).
1
See idat 19-20, 731 A.2d at 492. These constitutional limits prevent states from
circumventing due process by redefining essential elements of an offense as mere
sentencing factors. See idat 19, 731 A.2d at 492 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86).
9 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 20, 731 A.2d at 492. To prove the validity
of this
statement, the court used the example of first-degree kidnapping. See id.To be
convicted of this crime, the court explained, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the victim was not returned unscathed. See i& Therefore, the
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characterization of biased purpose as a motive because, unlike the
statute at issue, proof of traditional motives does not increase the
that a search
severity of punishment.'" Therefore, the court admitted
14
1
for additional controlling precedent was necessary.
Justice O'Hern conceded that NewJersey law did not control the
nor State v. Camacho'4
case at issue because neither Mortimew
addressed the sentence-enhancing provision or the constitutional
limits on allocating sentencing factors.'" Thus, Justice O'Hern noted
that the court's findings would only be temporary until the United
issue.'"
States Supreme Court definitively ruled on this due process
Imploring the Supreme Court to take action, the court compared the
similarities between federal hate crime laws and New Jersey's bias
crime statutes.'" Nevertheless, in the absence of such guidance from
court elaborated, if the Legislature's placement of the statute was dispositive, the
State could easily allow judges, and not juries, to assess the harm caused to
kidnapping victims. See id.
See id. The court clarified that whether one steals to feed his family or to satisfy
a drug habit does not increase the sentence for theft. See id. Thus, the court found
that labeling biased purpose as a motive is misleading because, in the context of a
criminal proceeding, it has vastly different consequences than do traditional motives.
See id. at 20-21, 731 A.2d at 492.
11 See id. at 21, 731 A.2d at
492.
42 See supranotes 115-20 and accompanying text (discussing Mortimer).
43 153 N.J. 54, 707 A.2d 455 (1998). In Camacho, the defendant attended
a party
at an apartment during which he turned on the stereo. See it. at 57, 707 A.2d at 456.
When the apartment tenant turned off the stereo, the defendant pulled out a
handgun and fired shots at the stereo and walls. See i& Subsequently, the defendant
was indicted on several counts of aggravated assault and weapons offenses, including
possession of a firearm with the intent to use it against the person or property of
another under title 2C, section 39-4(a) of the NewJersey Statutes. See i&.
Under the Graves Act, persons convicted of the above offense must be
sentenced to a minimum parole-ineligibility term. See i. at 56, 707 A.2d at 456
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(c) (West 1995)). The issue in Camacho was whether
ajury or the sentencing judge must determine whether a defendant intended to use
a firearm against a person, as opposed to the property of another. See i& at 56-57,
707 A.2d at 456. The court held that the sentencing court, and not the jury, should
make such a determination. See id. at 72, 707 A.2d at 464. As the Apprendi court
acknowledged, however, this decision did not explore the constitutional limits on
allocating sentencing factors to ajudge orjury. See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 21, 731 A.2d
at 493.
," See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 21, 731 A.2d at 492-93.
45 See id. at 22, 731 A.2d at 493.
14 See id. at 21-22, 731 A.2d at 493. The court noted that the amendments to the
federal sentencing guidelines include a hate crime penalty-enhancing provision that
applies to all federal crimes. See i& at 21, 731 A.2d at 493. The provision increases
the defendant's offense by three levels if
the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the court at sentencing determines beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any
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to examine existing precedent
the Supreme Court, the court resolved
7
disposition.1
proper
the
to discern
The court commenced by exploring Jones,"' the most recent
49
United States Supreme Court decision on the due process issue.'
While Jones declared that "'any fact (other than prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, ..'" the court found that this language was not essential to the
holding.'5 ' Moreover, because Jones did not explicitly overrule
Almendarez-Torres, 52 the court submitted that it was proper to follow
the latter decision. 53
The court remarked that Almendarez-Torres sustained a statute
that treated the existence of prior convictions as a sentencing factor
due to the longstanding tradition of recidivism as such.'5
Furthermore, the court pointed out that the Almendarez-Torres analysis
centered upon an examination of the McMiUan factors."" The court
then applied this Almendarez-Torres analysis to section 44-3(e) of the
NewJersey Statutes.'

6

The court found that, while New Jersey's hate crime sentenceenhancing provision does alter the maximum penalty for the offense,
it satisfies all of the other McMiUan factors: (1) the statute does not
presume an element of the offense in violation of Patterson; (2) there
is no great differential in sentencing; (3) the provision does not
property as the object of the offense because of the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or
sexual orientation of any person.
Id. at 21, 731 A.2d at 493 (citation omitted).
While this federal hate crime statute requires the jury to make the biasedpurpose determination as part of the trial, it does permit the judge to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant selected the victim because of race,
creed, or other characteristics. See id at 21-22, 731 A.2d at 493.
147 See i& at 22, 731
A.2d at 493.
48 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (analyzingJones
in detail).
49 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 22, 731 A.2d
at 493.
50 Id. (quotingJones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
51 See id.

See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text (discussing Almendarez-Torres).
See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 22-23, 731 A.2d at 493. The court did acknowledge,
however, that the Jones Court specifically excepted recidivism from its ruling and,
therefore, had no need to explicitly overrule Almendarez-Torres. See id&at 23 n.2, 731
A.2d at 494.
15 See id. at 23, 731 A.2d at
494.
15 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (reproducing the Almendarez-Torres
Court's application of the McMillan factors).
1
See Apprend4 159 N.J. at 23, 731 A.2d at 494.
:

5
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create a separate crime with a separate penalty; and (4) the New
Jersey Legislature did not enact this provision to evade the mandates
of due process.'57 Rather, Justice O'Hern contended that the
Legislature merely dictated the precise weight to be given to the
traditional biased-purpose sentencing factoriss
Moreover, the court argued that altering the maximum penalty
by itself is insufficient to declare the statute unconstitutional.'Justifying this conclusion, the court referenced State v. Krantz, 60 in
which a Montana sentencing provision was sustained even though it
authorized punishment beyond the maximum for the underlying
offense. 6 '
The court reasoned that because such sentence
enhancements are discretionary, their penalties may be even less
62
severe than a mandatory sentence without the possibility of parole.
The court further maintained that section 44-3(e) would not
infringe upon any constitutional liberties.'6 Referring to Graves Act"
See id. at 23-24, 731 A.2d at 494. In determining that the New Jersey
Legislature acted forthright in passing section 44-3(e), the court distinguished
Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998), in which an Arizona sentencing
provision was declared void because it maliciously withdrew traditional elements of
the crime and reclassified them as sentencing factors. See id
15
See id at 24, 731 A.2d at 494-95. The court claimed that, like the factor of
recidivism in Almendarez-Torres, biased purpose is a well-established sentencing factor.
See id., 731 A.2d at 495. In fact, the court maintained that section 44-1(2) has long
permitted the sentencing judge to consider the severity of the harm imposed on the
victim. See id
159 See id, 731 A.2d
at 495.
"0 788 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1990). In Krantz, the defendant engaged in a series of
armed robberies and was subsequently convicted of accountability in one holdup and
robbery in another. See id at 299. The defendant was sentenced to 30 years in
prison for each conviction. See id at 300. In addition, an extended term of 10 years
was imposed for each conviction under a Montana sentence-enhancing provision.
See id This statute authorized enhanced penalties for the use of a weapon in the
commission of a crime. See id at 301. The defendant challenged this sentenceenhancing provision, alleging that the use of a weapon in the commission of a crime
is either a distinct offense from the underlying crime or is an element of the
underlying crime. See id
1
See id at 303. The court rejected a narrow interpretation of McMillan that
would have all factors that alter the maximum penalty for a crime be deemed
separate offenses or elements of an offense subject to the requirements of due
process. See id
62 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 25, 731 A.2d at
495.
5

'6
1

See id

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(c) (West 1995)). The Graves Act states:
A person who has been convicted under 2C:39-4a of possession of a
firearm with intent to use it against the person of another, or of a
crime under any of the following sections: 2C:11-3, 2C:11-4, 2C:12-lb.,
2C:14-2a, 2C:14-3a, 2C:15-1, 2C:18-2, 2C:29-5, who, while in the course
of committing or attempting to commit the crime, including the
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decisions, the court insisted that there is rarely any doubt about the
factual issues that determine a sentence.
The court expounded
66
that State v. White solely turned on the legal issue of whether an
armed robbery accomplice, who did not possess a firearm, could be
sentenced under the Graves Act!". Similarly, the justice maintained
that State v. Stewart"s hinged on the legal question of whether
constructive possession of a firearm triggers a Graves Act sentence.16
Correspondingly, the court proclaimed that, in cases like Vawter and
Mortimer, the existence of a biased purpose is rarely in question."
The court also indicated that constitutional liberties are secured
under section 44-3(e) because the statute only applies when there is a
compelling state interest to combat hateful discrimination.'
immediate flight therefrom, used or was in possession of a firearm as
defined in 2C:39-1f, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by
the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a
minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, onethird and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or 3 years,
whichever is greater, or 18 months in the case of a fourth degree crime,
during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
65 See Apprendi, 159 NJ. at 25, 731 A.2d
at 495.

' 98 NJ. 122, 484 A.2d 691 (1984). In White, the defendant participated in two
separate robberies. See id. at 126, 484 A.2d at 693. During the commission of the
first robbery, the defendant and three other men drove to an area near a gas station.
See i& After a gun was exchanged in the presence of the defendant, two of the men
robbed the gas station at gunpoint. See id. Thereafter, all four men shared the
proceeds. See id. In the second robbery, the defendant informed one of his
accomplices that a particular individual had money concealed in his sock. See id. at
12627, 484 A.2d at 693. Shortly after, that accomplice used a gun to force that
individual into a car and rob him. See id. at 127, 484 A.2d at 693.
Subsequently, the defendant was convicted of various charges related to the
armed robberies and unlawful possession of a weapon. See id. At sentencing, the
trial court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence under the Graves Act, even
though the defendant never physically possessed a gun during the commission of
either robbery. See id.
67 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 25, 731 A.2d at 495.
168 96 N.J. 596, 477 A.2d 300 (1984). The defendant in Stewart leapt out of a pickup truck, stuck a flare gun in the side of an individual standing on the comer, and
robbed him of $50. See id. at 599, 477 A.2d at 301. While the defendant claimed that
he merely stole a bag of marijuana that the individual was selling, a jury convicted
him of second-degree unarmed robbery.
See id. at 600, 477 A.2d at 302.
Nevertheless, because the jury believed that the defendant was in possession of a
firearm, he was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence under the Graves Act.
See id. at 600-01, 477 A.2d at 302. The defendant appealed, maintaining that
constructive possession of a firearm does not warrant a minimum term under the
Act. See id. at 601, 477 A.2d at 302.
169 See Apprendi, 159 NJ. at 25, 731 A.2d at 495.
170 See id
1
See id. (citing People v. MacKenzie, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 800-01 (Cal. Ct. App.

20001

HATE CRIME LEGISLATION

917

Next, Justice O'Hern dismissed the fear that the court might
allow the Legislature to undermine traditional rights to trial by jury
The court decided to guard these
and due process of law.'
constitutional rights by prohibiting the Legislature from reallocating
traditional mens rea" or grading factors as mere sentencing factors to
be determined by ajudge.'7 4
While acknowledging that Florida, under a similar hate crime
statute, requires the jury to make the biased-purpose determination,
the court proceeded to identify the problems with this approach."'
The court predicted that a defendant would be subject to a great risk
76
of prejudice if his former acts of bias were exposed to the jury.
Such evidence of racial or ethnic hatred, the justice forewarned, has
the potential to inflame ajury.'"
1995)).
1
See id. at 25-26, 731 A.2d at 495.
1
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990) (defining mens ea "[a]s an
element of criminal responsibility: a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a
criminal intent"). Since the seventeenth century, common-law crimes have required
both the commission of an act and the existence of a culpable state of mind. See
J.W.C. Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 31, 35
(1938).
Culpability "requires a showing that [the criminal] acted purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each
material element of the offense." BLACK'S LAW DiCnONARY 379 (6th ed. 1990).
Consequently, the most serious culpable state of mind is one of purpose, followed by
knowledge, recklessness, and lastly, negligence. See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking
Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 463 (1992). These varying culpable states, with
their respective degrees of severity, are significant because "deeply ingrained in our
legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more
serious is the offense, and therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished."
Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating Between
Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 21, 39-40 (1997).
In contrast, strict liability crimes do not require the accused to possess a
particular state of mind. See WAYNE I. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAw § 3.8, at 340 (1986). Strict liability offenses are defined as "(unlawful
acts whose elements do not contain the need for criminal intent or mens rea."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990); see also Simons, supra, at 463 (noting
that the concept of strict liability permits the absence of a culpable mental state).
Because they are void of any mental culpability requirements, strict liability offenses
do not carry harsh punishments, such as imprisonment. See LAAVE & SCOTr, supra,
at 340-41. Generally, strict liability crimes entail "acts that endanger the public
welfare, such as illegal dumping of toxic wastes." BLACK'S LAw DICTnONARY 1422 (6th
ed. 1990).
74 See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 25-26, 731 A.2d at 495.
75 See id. at 26, 731 A.2d at 495.
1
See id.
M See id., 731 A.2d at 495-96. In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to
State v. Crumb, 277 N.J. Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879 (App. Div. 1994), in which the court
insulated a bias count from the other counts at trial to reduce the risk of prejudice.
See id. (citing Crumb, 277 N.J. Super. at 321, 649 A.2d at 884). The court also
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The court concluded that a biased purpose is not an element of
the offense of possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.18
Rather, the court asserted that a biased purpose, like recidivism, is a
traditional and objective sentencing factor."* Therefore, via the
constitutional calculus of McMillan, Justice O'Hern upheld section
44-3(e) and ruled that a sentencing judge may determine the
presence of a biased purpose by a preponderance of the evidence.180
The court stressed that New Jersey's hate crime sentence-enhancing
1 The
provision requires a delicate balance of constitutional rights.""
court explained that, while NewJersey's laws do not punish thoughts,
they do punish crimes motivated by invidious discrimination more
severely.'8 In the present matter, the court articulated, there is no
question that Apprendi acted with a biased purpose in shooting at his
neighbor's home.'8 Therefore, the court affirmed the extended
sentence upheld by the appellate division.""
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stein, joined by Justice Handler,
denounced the finding that a biased purpose is not an element of the
considered State v. Carter,91 N.J. 86, 449 A.2d 1280 (1982), in which the court
admitted evidence of racism, holding that it was not so prejudicial as to outweigh its
probative value. See id. (citing Carter,91 N.J. at 107-08, 449 A.2d at 1291-92).
1
See id. at 27, 731 A.2d at 496. The court stated that the Legislature's
designation of biased purpose as a sentencing factor, and not an element of an
offense, supports this conclusion. See id In addition, the court noted that the
Leklature's motive for doing so was not constitutionally suspect. See id.
See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (reproducing the AlmendarezTorresCourt's characterization of recidivism).
80 See Apprendi, 159 NJ. at 27,
731 A.2d at 496.
a] See id. The court asserted that the requirements of title 2C, section 44-3(e) are
strict. See id. at 27-28, 731 A.2d at 496. To impose an extended sentence under this
provision, the defendant must do more than exhibit bias during the commission of
an offense. See id. at 28, 731 A.2d at 496. Rather, the court assessed, the statute
requires that the defendant's purpose in committing the crime was to exhibit bias.
See ii
The court likened this interpretation to Florida's hate crime sentenceenhancing provision reviewed in Dobbins v. State. See id., 731 A.2d at 496-97 (citing
Dobbins, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), af'd, 631 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1994)).
That statute stated that the "'penalty for any felony or misdemeanor shall be
reclassified as provided in this subsection if the commission of such felony or
misdemeanor evidences prejudice based on the race, color, ancestry, ethnicity,
religion or national origin of the victim.'" Dobbins, 605 So. 2d at 923 (quoting FIA.
STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1989)). The court held that the jury must find that the
defendant intentionally selected the victim and committed the crime because of the
race of the victim. See i& The court rejected the notion that an extended sentence
could be imposed simply because the defendant made a racial slur during the
commission of the crime. See id.
l See Apprendi, 159 NJ. at 27, 731 A.2d at 496.
93 See id. at 28-29, 731
A.2d at 497.
18
See id. at 29, 731 A.2d at 497.
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Rather, Justice Stein argued that a biased purpose
crime ' 85
necessarily involves an aspect of criminal intent.Iss The dissent
insisted that, unlike the factors in Almendarez-Torres87 and Jones,'88 a
biased purpose relates to the defendant's conduct and his subjective
purpose in committing the underlying offense.'8 Thus, Justice Stein
declared that such conduct, coupled with a purposeful state of mind,
unmistakably embodies the characteristics of an element of an
offense and therefore must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.'9

The dissent concluded that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, section 44-3(e) violates the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Justice that define conduct, mental states, and elements of
an offense. l9 ' Justice Stein also stated that this statute breached the

Due Process Clause, the Sixth Amendment's notice and jury trial
guarantees,'9 and Article 1 of the New Jersey Constitution.!
Moreover, the dissent articulated, because a biased purpose
potentially doubles the term of imprisonment for a defendant, this
critical determination must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable

See id at 48, 731 A.2d at 510 (Stein,J., dissenting).
See id at 49, 731 A.2d at 510 (Stein,J., dissenting).
187 See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text (discussing Almendarez-Torres).
1
See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (analyzingJones).
1
See Apprendi, 159 N.J. at 49, 731 A.2d at 510 (Stein,J., dissenting).
190 See id. at 50-51, 731 A.2d at 511 (Stein,J., dissenting).
191 See id at 51, 731 A.2d at 510-11 (Stein, J., dissenting). The Code of
Criminal
Justice states that "'[clonduct' means an action or omission and its accompanying
state of mind, or, where relevant, a series of acts and omissions.'" Id. (quoting N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14(d) (West 1995)).
An element of an offense is defined as "(1) such conduct or (2) such attendant
circumstances or (3) such a result of conduct as (a) is included in the description of
the forbidden conduct in the definition of the offense; (b) establishes the required
kind of culpability, (c) negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct; (d)
negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; or (e) establishes jurisdiction or
venue." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14(h) (West 1995).
General requirements of culpability are established in a provision stating that "a
person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the
offense." Id. § 2C:2-2(a). Additionally, "purposely," the mental state required by the
hate crime sentence-enhancing provision, is defined as a "conscious object to engage
in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." Id. § 2C:2-2 (b) (1).
192 The Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant be tried by "an
impartial
jury" and "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
1
See Apprendi, 159 NJ. at 51, 731 A.2d at 511-12 (Stein, J., dissenting). Article 1,
paragraph I of the NewJersey Constitution embodies the safeguards of due process.
See id. (citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 568, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (1985)).
185
186
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Finally, Justice Stein chided the court for drawing an analogy
between a biased purpose and recidivism.' 9 The dissent determined
that recidivism, unlike biased purpose, is objectively determined
based upon the official court record and involves no inquiry of the
mental state of the defendant.'9 While agreeing with the majority
that evidence of a biased purpose increases the risk of prejudice for
defendants, the dissent suggested a bifurcated trial to reduce such
danger" Therefore, reiterating the unconstitutionality of section 443(e), Justice Stein announced that Apprendi's conviction and
extended sentence should be reversed and the matter remanded for
a new trial consistent with the dissenting opinion.'"
In deciding that a biased purpose is not an element of an
offense, Apprendi departed from binding authority in Jones. In that
decision, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held that any
fact, other than recidivism, that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in an indictment and proven to ajury beyond
a reasonable doubt.'" The Apprendi court, however, incorrectly found
19 See id. at 52, 731 A.2d at 512 (Stein, J., dissenting).

Justice Stein noted the
majority's unwillingness to decide whether such a large expansion of the sentencing
range violated due process. See id. The dissent then criticized such reluctance as a
manifestation of the court's discomfort with having the judge, and not the jury,
determine a fact that materially affects the sentence. See i4&
9
See id.
1
See id. Justice Stein opined:
The factor of recidivism is readily determined on the basis of the
official court record of a prior conviction; it involves no inquiry into
the defendant's conduct in perpetrating the current offense; and
recidivism, of course, involves no inquiry in connection with the
defendant's mental state in committing the current offense. Neither
the Jones case, in which the sentencing factor was serious bodily injury
to a carjacking victim, nor McMillan, in which the sentencing factor was
visible possession of a firearm in the course of committing various
felonies, required the sentencer to make findings of fact, such as are
required by N.J.SA 2C:44-3(e), about the mental state of a defendant
when he committed the subject offense. Because under our Code a
finding that a defendant possessed the requisite mental state is
indispensable to a conviction, NJ.S.A. 2C:2-2, there simply can be no
doubt that the defendant's purpose to intimidate these victims because
of their race must be regarded as a material element of the charged
offenses.
IM at 52-53, 731 A.2d at 512 (Stein,J., dissenting).
197 See id. at 53, 731 A.2d at 512-13 (Stein,J., dissenting).
The court used this type
of bifurcated procedure in State v. Ragland See id. (citing State v. Ragland, 101 NJ.
33, 35, 499 A.2d 1366, 1367-68 (1985), reconsidered,105 NJ. 189 (1986)).
198 See idi at 53-54, 731 A.2d at 513 (Stein, J.,
dissenting).
1
See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (discussing Jones). The Jones
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that this language was not essential to the holding and instead
followed the Almendarez-Torres analysis. In so doing, the majority
distorted a clear mandate from our nation's highest court.
The need for ajury to make the biased purpose determination is
apparent from the facts of the Apprendi case itself. The defendant's
purpose in shooting at his neighbor's home remains unclear. While
Apprendi initially admitted that he shot at the house because he
wanted to keep African-Americans out of his neighborhood,' he
later retracted this statement, claiming that he merely shot at glass
and a purple door that had caught his eye.' 1 Thus, because
reasonable persons could disagree as to Apprendi's mental state at
the time of the shooting, a jury is best suited to make this critical
determination. 0 '
The fate of section 44-3(e) and all other similar sentenceenhancing provisions is yet to be determined. During the 1999
Term, the United States Supreme Court will review State v. Apprendi
and definitively resolve this due process dilemma. 3 In so doing, the
Court needs to delineate the constitutional limits on legislatures'
ability to define the elements of an offense. Until such time, states
will have to continue to walk an unidentified path that strikes a
balance between state autonomy to define crimes and the safeguards
for criminal defendants embodied in the Due Process Clause.
JoshuaS. Bratspies

Court declared:
The dissent repeatedly chides us for failing to state precisely enough
the principle animating our view that the carjacking statute, as
construed by the Government, may violate the Constitution. The
preceding paragraph in the text expresses that principle plainly
enough, and we re-state it here: under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to ajury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (citations omitted).
"0 See text accompanying note 33 supra (reproducing the defendant's
incriminating statement).
201
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances
surrounding the defendant's retraction).
2M
SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 489 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (noting that common-law courts presented disputed facts to ajury).

SeeApprendi v. NewJersey, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999) (granting Apprendi's petition
for a writ of certiorari on November 29, 1999).
M

